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Abstract 
 
Between 1995 and 2007, the world’s economies embraced neoliberal reforms and 
prospered, a coincidence that is often taken as proof that liberal economies grow 
faster.  A large body of econometric research shows that “freer” economies are more 
prosperous.  I levy two methodological criticisms at this literature that ultimately 
render a very different picture of pro-market reforms’ relationship with growth.  My 
analysis suggests that neoliberal reforms did not significantly affect growth where 
they did not ease public financing or encourage foreign investment.  The evidence does 
not suggest that the economic prosperity of the past 20 years is due to economic 
liberalism per se, but rather the developing world enjoying stabilized macrofinancial 
systems and a global investment boom.  Neoliberal reforms may have helped produce 
this stability and investment, but systemic financial stabilization was only one of 
several goals that they pursued.  A sober interpretation of the data finds little evidence 
for believing that economies will prosper as they embrace laissez-faire ideals. 
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An economy is more “liberal” when its private sector owns and controls more of society’s 
economic activity.  Over the last quarter-century, virtually all the world’s countries have liberalized 
their economies substantially.  These reforms have included tax and spending cuts, deregulation, 
privatization, public program cutbacks, government downsizing and the easing of government-
imposed barriers to international trade and capital movements.  Liberalization (or “neoliberal”) 
economic reforms are widely believed to have helped countries prosper over the 1990s and 2000s 
(for reviews, see Yergin and Stanislaw 2002; Harvey 2007; Centeno and Cohen 2010).  This belief is 
supported by several econometric studies.   
This paper offers a critical reexamination of an active and well-publicized body of 
econometric research linking economic liberalism to faster economic growth.  These studies, which 
are built on the Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney and Lawson 
2009), suffer from two methodological problems that are common among strong pro-market, anti-
state policy postures.  First, most analyses fail to differentiate a liberal policy environment from 
good governance or macroeconomic performance.  Second, analysts often treat the relationship 
between economic liberalism and prosperity as time-invariant.  Addressing these two criticisms 
leads to a very different picture economic liberalism’s relationship with prosperity.   
Since 1980, the most prosperous developing countries have been those that attracted 
foreign direct investment and maintained sustainable public finances, and these two factors render 
the effects of economic liberalization insignificant.  Liberalization reforms seem to have 
differentiated fast-from slow-growth countries in only one period: near the end of the Cold War.  I 
will argue that liberalism’s strong but temporary relationship with growth is part of a complicated 
set of societal changes occurring around the end of the Cold War, including the containment of a 
global financial crisis, dramatic improvements in governance, and a boom in global investment.  
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Many analysts believe that liberalization reforms helped restore global prosperity because they put 
private markets in control of the economy, and markets are inherently superior modes of economic 
organization.  Empirically, the relationship between growth and liberalism is weak, and requires 
several twists of reasoning. 
 These findings question the continuing benefits of hard pro-market, anti-interventionist 
policy postures.  Neoliberal reforms proved effective in a particular historical context, and bore 
fruit with considerable interventions in financial markets.  In some respects, our continuing 
commitment to neoliberal policy looks like an institutionalized belief that has been over-extended 
and possibly decoupled from the exigencies that they were originally designed to address.  This 
continuing commitment is certainly not a product of a conservative interpretation of the data.   
Market Liberalization & the Pursuit of Prosperity 
Between WWII and the 1980s, the world’s economies were governed by policy strategies in 
which governments played a comparatively active role in shaping the behavior of markets (Ruggie 
1982; Centeno and Cohen 2010).  These strategies materialized concretely in a wide range of 
“government interventions” in economic markets: high taxation and spending, active government 
investment, public ownership of economic enterprises and strategic resources, barriers on 
international trade and capital exchange, heavy domestic market regulation, high levels of public 
employment and a rich range of government-sponsored social programs.   The government 
interventionism of the mid-20th century produced considerable global prosperity and stability 
during much of the 1950s and 1960s, but these systems fell into chronic recession, inflation, 
unemployment and fiscal problems during the 1970s and 1980s (Cohen 2011). 
In the context of these problems, neoliberalism arose as an influential economic policy 
movement.  Neoliberalism is a political and ideological movement that opposes governments’ 
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expansive postwar economic roles, and its economic policy positions advocate a return to the small 
“hands-off” economic governance that prevailed prior to the World Wars.  This movement became 
highly influential by the late-1980s, producing a range of reforms that came to define the 
organization of the world’s economies during the 1990s and 2000s  (Harvey 2007; Centeno and 
Cohen 2010).  Concretely, neoliberal economic reforms embraced globalization, deregulation, 
privatization, welfare state cutbacks, regressive taxation and overall government downsizing.  They 
were secured during a period in which policy-makers came to see liberalization as important, if not 
necessary, to extricate their countries from the economic quagmires of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Ultimately, these reforms appeared to have paid off in many ways (for details, see Cohen 
2011).  Over much of the 1970s and early -1980s, the world economy was prone to stagnant 
growth, frequent economic contract, high and volatile inflation, and worsening employment levels.  
Neoliberal reforms were adopted widely and aggressively between the mid-1980s and early-1990s, 
and were followed by worldwide improvements in growth and inflation containment.  Since the 
mid-1990s, neoliberal economic reforms have been well-entrenched, and the world’s economies 
generally posted maintained stable positive growth rates until 2008. 
What happened to produce these macroeconomic changes?  In the 1970s, the concatenation 
of several (geo)political, economic and social problems caused the rich world to fall into an 
economic crisis characterized by high inflation, economic stagnancy, eroding public finances and 
high unemployment (see Block 1977; Barsky and Kilian 2001; Harvey 2007).  In earlier phases of 
this crisis, developing countries’ economic insularity and massive deficit spending mitigated the 
immediate impact of the First World’s economic problems.  Western banks fell into a sovereign 
lending mania, providing the developing world’s governments with abundant and cheap credit 
(Sachs 1989).  With loose credit, policy-makers could prop up growth during this period, albeit at 
the expense of high inflation and eroding government creditworthiness.  The scheme’s effectiveness 
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proved to be temporary.  Countries amassed massive debts that became harder to roll over as 
global interest rates rose.   
In1982, Mexico threatened to default on its debts, triggering a panic in sovereign lending 
markets (Sachs 1989).  The debt crisis left many developing world governments in a state of virtual 
bankruptcy, unable to borrow enough money to finance their operations and hampered in their 
efforts to negotiate financially-viable budgets by political gridlock (Acosta and Coppedge 2001).  As 
a last resort, many of them printed money to sustain their operations, which exacerbated inflation 
to the point that prices could change daily (or even during a day).  Government bankruptcy, policy-
making paralysis and high inflation unleashed a wider range of problems that caused economic 
hardship in the developing world over the 1980s.  In the absence of a functional government, 
working money and credit systems and stable access to foreign resources, economies tend not to 
work well. 
Advocacy for deep liberalization reforms gained credence in this context, and this influence 
came from several quarters.  One source of advocacy came from economists associated with the 
Chicago School, who often attacked government intervention as a faulty principle of economic 
governance.  They characterized state economic interventions as ill-informed, ill-directed, ill-timed, 
ineffective and counter-productive (Hayek 1945; Friedman 1968; Kruger 1990).  Government-
managed economies were portrayed as being vulnerable to corruption or anti-economic political 
influences (Kruger 1974; Dornbusch and Edwards 1989).  Regulations were said to waste resources 
(reviewed in Guash and Hahn 1999), and welfare to discourage work effort (see Gueron 1990).  In 
this view, developing countries’ economic problems were the result of their state-managed 
economies, which by nature fostered waste, corruption, indolence, mismanagement, inflexibility 
and stagnancy.  The solution, they argued, was to liberalize the economy.  Markets were portrayed 
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as intrinsically superior modes of organizing economic activity, with an inherent disposition to 
improve economic dynamism, innovation, adaptability, productivity and efficiency. 
Another source of advocacy, which includes the often-cited “Washington Consensus” 
(Williamson 1990), was more firmly oriented towards the resolution of the debt crisis itself.  
Despite portrayals this Consensus as a raw endorsement of free market reforms writ large, its 
reforms –  fiscal austerity, tax reforms, easing capital market price controls, trade and inward 
investment liberalization, privatization, deregulation and property rights protection  – were not 
being implied to secure long-term growth.1  Likewise, they did not advocate wholesale cutbacks for 
government programs and power, allowing for education, health care and public infrastructure 
investment as appropriate subjects of state intervention.  Rather, the Consensus was engaging the 
issue that developing countries’ governments were hemorrhaging money and their politicians 
could not agree on policy changes that would stop the bleed.  Potential donor governments and 
private investors were reluctant to extend new loans to these governments out of fear that, without 
serious fiscal changes, such loans would be tantamount to pouring money down a black hole.  As a 
result, capital rushed out of the country, governments often had to print money to cover their 
obligations, and confidence in the financial system was negligible. 
By the end of the 1980s and the conclusion of the Cold War, the US government and 
international financial institutions developed programs in which distressed governments could 
have their debt issues underwritten in exchange for liberalization reforms (Edwards 1995; Kolodko 
2000: 299 - 301; Dreher 2002; Babb and Carruthers 2008).  These debt guarantees would help 
governments borrow again, and in turn forge policy with workable finances.  Developing world 
                                                             
1 “Dornbusch … has recently raised the question of whether the Washington agenda described above can be 
relied on to restore growth once stabilization has been achieved. He points to the disappointing experiences 
of Bolivia and Mexico, where determined and effective stabilization has not yet resulted in a resumption of 
growth. If he is right in his contention that entrepreneurs may adopt a wait-and-see policy after stabilization 
rather than promptly committing themselves to the risks involved in new investment, the important question 
arises as to what must be added to Washington's policy advice in order to restore growth” (Williamson 1990) 
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politicians could also deflect some of the anger that would inevitably arise after spending cuts, tax 
changes and public sector cutbacks.  They could shift blame to these donors, and portray 
themselves as having been strong-armed into reform.  In so doing, the US and IMF provided 
political breathing space that allowed politicians to break the gridlock that kept their states in 
serious deficit.  
With these debt-refinancing schemes, both public finances and macrofinancial systems 
stabilized, helping to make these countries viable investment outlets for foreign enterprises.  These 
possibilities to attract foreign investment multiplied with a rapid boom in real investment after the 
Cold War’s end.  The result was hard currency inflows to developing countries, an easing of the debt 
crisis, and a newfound prosperity in many previously distressed countries. 
This sequence of events offers a strong suggestion that neoliberal reforms ultimately saved 
the developing world’s economies.  The world’s governments intervened in their economies 
actively during the 1970s and 1980s, and their economies were stuck in crisis.  Once they 
deinstitutionalized these various forms of interventionism and put private markets back in control, 
inflation stabilized and economic growth resumed (although unemployment and equality generally 
worsened).   
Probing the View that Markets Produce Prosperity  
The previous section discussed two views of the relationship between liberalism and 
prosperity.  Some observers suggest that market-organized economic activity is by nature more 
amenable to economic prosperity, compared to government-administered activity.  Others see the 
resolution of the developing world’s debt crises and the stabilization of their macrofinancial 
systems as essential to restoring economic stability and growth of the 1990s and 2000s.  These two 
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explanations of the economic recovery experienced after the Cold War imply different guidelines 
for economic policy-makers today. 
The first interpretation, that unfettered markets induce economic prosperity by nature, is 
manifest in policies favor tax cuts over public spending when trying to stimulate the economy, shy 
away from stringent regulation even when deregulated markets clearly fail to work well, or assume 
that public enterprises or investment initiatives will perform poorly compared to private ones.  In 
contrast, the second view sees no fundamental problem with government efforts to steer their 
economies if states maintain sustainable budgets, monetary policy, reasonable balances of 
payments and no extreme imbalances in their private financial markets.  By this second line of 
reasoning, there is no principle of good policy that would discourage a country from nationalizing 
its health care system, engaging in major public works programs or regulating markets.  Problems 
arise when policies promote systemic financial risk. 
Anyone reviewing the mainstream academic economic literature will have some difficulty 
assembling a substantial body of mainstream research that advocates laissez-faire with few 
conditions.  Much of this literature outlines the benefits of intermediate policy goals for which 
neoliberal policies strive – like large trade sectors, deep private capital markets or adaptive labor 
markets– but does not establish a direct relationship between neoliberal policy and economic 
performance.  In most corners of the academic economics literature, support for neoliberal policy is 
rather conditional.  Surveys of academic economists suggest that orthodox laissez-faire attitudes are 
rare outside of trade policy, and most of them see moderate economic intervention as desirable 
(Klein and Stern 2007).   
The strongest and least conditional advocacy of harder neoliberal positions comes from 
studies sponsored by conservative-leaning think tanks, like the Heritage Foundation/Wall St. 
Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom (Miller and Holmes 2010) or the Frasier Institute’s Economic 
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Freedom of the World (EFW) (Gwartney and Lawson 2009).  Of these two think tank reports, the 
EFW has been examined most often in scholastic journals, in part because its index is reasonably 
rigorous and transparent.  The EFW authors estimated in 2003 that this data has been used in over 
200 scholarly articles (Gwartney and Lawson 2006: 5), and these lines of discussion have continued 
throughout this decade.  Many of them support the conclusion that “freer” economies grow faster 
(for a review, see De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006).  
EFW-based studies that assess the relationship between economic growth and freedom 
have generally confirmed this relationship using a range of sophisticated regression methods and 
wide array of controls.  At first glance, this relationship’s confirmation in multiple studies lends 
credence to the often-recited policy axiom that freer markets are more generally prosperous.  
However, there are two more basic methodological problems that unduly contribute to these 
confirmatory findings: (1) the validity of the EFW index as a measure of free market capitalism, and 
(2) ahistoricity in these analyses, whereby the EFW-growth relationship is assumed to be stable 
over time.   
Purity of Measurement.  Scholastic studies that use the EFW treat it as a proxy for a 
“market economy” (Berggren 2003), “liberalization” (De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006), 
“neoliberal” economies (Tures 2003) or some cognate concept that suggests a more liberal 
capitalism.  With this understanding of what is signaled by the EFW index, the index’s relationships 
with growth are thus taken as real world relationships between prosperity and liberalism.   
In strict terms, EFW purports to measure “economic freedom”, which the study’s authors 
describe as “institutions and policies are consistent with economic freedom when they provide an 
infrastructure for voluntary exchange and protect individuals and their property from aggressors” 
(Gwartney and Hall 2009: 4).  Empirically, this notion of “freedom” stresses (1) minimal government 
ownership or control of society’s economic resources and enterprises and (2) minimal state 
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interference in private sector activity. Roughly 80% of a country’s “freedom” score is determined by 
the relative absence of government economic intervention.    
Although it has much overlap with economic liberalism, the EFW’s empirical construction 
incorporates additional factors. Cohen (2009) presents empirical evidence that the index’s 
construction effectively measures the degree to which a country’s national economic policy model 
resembles those of the English-speaking OECD and Switzerland, rich and well-governed countries 
that have pursued free market policies.  Although it is true that “economic freedom”, as defined by 
its authors, is a hallmark of the rich world overall, the non-Anglo-Swiss OECD’s scores are buoyed 
by the EFW’s Legal Structure & Property Rights sub-index, which shows a stronger relationship via 
confirmatory factor analysis to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2009) than other, more strictly laissez-faire related EFW sub-indices.   
This discrepant EFW sub-index is argued by Cohen (2009) to be capturing what is typically 
understood as “good governance” (discussed in Burki and Perry 1998): the degree to which a 
political economic system is politically accountable, politically stable, ruled by law, non-corrupt and 
managed by a professional and competent civil service.  Its inclusion in the EFW is tantamount to a 
conflation of two related but distinct concepts.  While economic liberalism and good governance are 
often both present in the world’s most advanced countries, many OECD national economic models 
maximize good governance without maximizing economic liberalism (see below).  Distinguishing 
good governance from economic liberalism is not only a methodologically valid re-specification of a 
country’s economic policy environment, but is also meaningful because it enables us to assess the 
relative effectiveness of Anglo-Swiss economic models versus other models used in the rich world. 
A second issue is the possible conflation of “economic freedom” and macroeconomic 
performance (De Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006; Cohen 2009).  Specifically, the EFW’s Access to 
Sound Money sub-index uses inflation rates and variability as constituent measures.  While a stable 
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money system is essential to a well-functioning market economy, and inflation can be the result of 
government actions (e.g., seigniorage, aggressive monetary policy or chronic deficit spending), the 
degree to which these metrics capture hands-off economic governance versus the success of 
macroeconomic policy merits questioning.  Inflation can be pursued and influenced, but not 
completely controlled, by policy-makers, and in this sense resembles economic growth or 
unemployment rather than deregulation or tax reductions.  Furthermore, there are situations in 
which “economically free” countries can be more vulnerable to inflation problems.   For example, 
economic openness can make a country more vulnerable to price destabilization stemming from 
external price shocks not directly attributable to their own economic failings [for example, in global 
commodity price spikes or currency crises rooted in contagion or self-fulfilling prophesy (on the 
latter topic, see Flood and Marion 1999)]. 
With these two concerns in mind, the analysis that follows seeks to parse the EFW’s 
governance and inflation components from its other measures of “economic freedom”.  This is done 
by separating the index into three different measures, whose empirical construction mirrors the 
agglomerative techniques used to construct the original EFW index.   
Ahistoricity and Omitted Variables.  The issue of ahistoricity in time series analysis is 
discussed in Isaac and Griffin (1989).  Ahistorical analyses tend to ignore meaningful differences in 
the historical contexts modeled by their theories and measured by their quantitative data.  In terms 
of our present discussion, ahistoricism produces the impression that liberalism’s relationship with 
economic activity operates in the same way over recent history.  The effectiveness of these reforms 
is often understood as intrinsic to market- versus government-dominated economies, and not 
contingent on, for example, states’ fiscal crises during the 1980s and early-1990s, the boom in 
international investment that materialized after the Cold War’s end, or today’s ongoing global 
financial crisis.  Neoliberalism took root at a time when developing countries were plagued by 
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public financial and money system problems during the 1980s, and neoliberal policy was 
implemented as part of a broader recovery package and set of historical circumstances that 
included public debt bailouts and an “emerging markets” investment mania in the rich world from 
the early-1990s.   
Understanding the potential importance of the debt crisis from which neoliberal reforms 
emerged is important for several reasons.  The debt crisis itself is a reason that developing 
countries performed so poorly in the 1980s, but claims about the economic benefit of liberalization 
often extend beyond the resolution of such macrofinancial crises.  Any observed improvement in 
economic growth realized after 1990 is produced by comparing countries in the midst of a systemic 
financial meltdown versus those that returned to macrofinancial stability.  If these improvements 
are the product of the developmental benefits conferred by neoliberal policies per se, as opposed to 
concurrent developments, then we can be better assured that free markets help countries grow.   
The analysis below suggests that scholars’ common attribution of developing world 
prosperity may be confusing the effectiveness of free markets from the idiosyncratic political and 
economic factors that helped resolve a very specific historical crisis.  When neoliberalism’s 
relationship with growth is examined on a period-by-period basis, the former exerts a predictive 
power around 1990, when developing countries were being rewarded by debt bailout programs 
and an emerging markets investment mania.  Neoliberalism’s failure to differentiate fast- from 
slow-growth countries outside of this period suggests that countries are not engaged in some kind 
of trans-historical process that continually rewards the world’s most liberal countries with faster 
growth.  Liberalism’s capacity to discern growth rates in a limited time frame suggests that some 
important set of variables is being omitted. 
The EFW’s secondary literature has attempted to deal with this concern over omitted 
controls by using extreme bounds analysis (Levine and Renelt 1992), a method in which a 
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regression’s key predictors’ robustness is tested against the inclusion of tens of controls through 
thousands of regressions that use them in different combinations.  This technique for dealing with 
omitted variable bias resembles a form a data mining, in which an analysts throws a bucket of 
controls at a relationship without making a large investment in discerning which of these controls 
may be of particular relevance, given the broader context in which these case studies unfolded.  As 
such, potential controls that seem highly relevant – like the easing of public financial pressures or 
the boom in developing market investment – are included as one of many controls in a larger grab-
bag of standard, off-the-shelf and often marginally successful other controls.  When the threshold 
for accepting a hypothesis under sensitivity analysis is lowered to accept predictors that commonly, 
rather than strictly, maintain predictive power net of this grab bag of controls (Sala-i-Martin 1997), 
it can be less surprising that they pass the test.  The vast majority of the controls included in the 
sensitivity analyses had non-compelling reasons for being included in the first place, and predictors 
that maintain significance net of these controls pass the test. 
By paying close attention to periodicity (the potential that empirical relationships vary over 
time), an analysis can be alerted to the possibility that the relationships inhering in one context 
drive the overall findings obtained in larger panels.  When these consequential historical moments 
are identified, they can be examined in depth to find controls that are more meaningful.  Doing so in 
this analysis drew attention to the potential importance of financial concerns, which ultimately 
steered this examination to substantially different conclusions. 
Data & Methods 
The analyses presented below examine the relationship between economic growth and 
liberalization, with the intent of probing the often-cited proposition that economically “freer” 
countries are generally more prosperous.  It engages existing literature on this topic with two 
methodological qualms: the measurement of liberalism and ahistoricity. 
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Units of Analysis.  The data examines individual countries as a panel of six five-year periods 
from 1980 to 2007 (with the last period covering only three years).  This panel design is the 
product of the EFW being assessed over five-year intervals prior to 2000.  EFW scores represent 
the mean of each period’s starting and end points, and data that is available on a yearly basis is 
presented as a within-period mean. 
Dependent Variable.   The study’s dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP 
(2005 $PPP) from the World Bank (2010). 
“Economic Freedom” Measures. Gwartney and Lawson’s (2009) Economic Freedom of the 
World index is constructed as an average score of five sub-indices, each of which purports to 
capture some facet of “economic freedom” as its authors define the concept.  These five sub-indices 
are listed below in Table 1.  Each sub-index is, in turn, an averaging of standardized empirical 
indicators that suggest the presence or absence of its corresponding sub-domain of freedom.  The 
empirical indicators are listed in the right column of Table 1, and further details are given in 
Gwartney, Hall and Lawson’s methodological index. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The EFW was deconstructed to parse out constituent measures that capture liberal policy 
from other components.  The Legal Structure & Security of Property Rights sub-index is treated as an 
independent variable that captures “good governance” (along the lines of Burki and Perry 1998; 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).  Inflation rates are assessed as long-transformed GDP 
deflator  change measures (from World Bank 2010).  The remaining EFW measures are re-
agglomerated using the same averaging of nested sub-indexes without the extricated measures, 
resulting in an assessment of “economic liberalism” that is separate from good governance and 
stable prices. 
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Easing the Strain of the 1980s Crisis.  In this account, international investment and the 
stabilization of public finances play a potentially important role in shaping developing countries’ 
economic fates during the 1990s and 2000s.  The former concept is captured by measures of net 
inward foreign direct investment (% GDP).  A country with higher scores in this measure is 
experiencing a higher influx of real investment in factories, infrastructure and business startups 
and expansions.  The latter is captured by central government debt (% GDP) and fiscal (cash) 
surplus (% GDP).  Governments with large cash deficits must secure loans on debt markets, and 
those with high debt levels are taken to face difficulties when borrowing, ceteris paribus.   
Per Capita GDP.  In addition to these measures, the analysis considers logged real per 
capita GDP (PPP) (from World Bank 2010) as a proxy for a society’s aggregate wealth.  Doing so 
enables us to distinguish the effects of being rich from being liberal, well-governed or price-stable. 
REGRESSION MODELS 
This paper asks whether economically liberal countries enjoyed faster economic growth, 
and whether this relationship varies across historical context.   
Period-Wise Cross-Sectional Regressions.  To assess the degree to which these factors 
differentiate high- from low-growth countries in individual historical periods, I employ a cross-
sectional robust OLS regression of economic growth on its predictors in five-year intervals from 
1980 to 2007.  If economic liberalism is a timeless predictor across these periods, we can take 
neoliberal principles to be a strong general guide to policy.  If it does not, then we have to examine 
what contextual changes led it to differentiate high- from low-growth countries when it did. 
Cross-Sectional Time Series Regressions.  These cross-sectional comparisons cannot 
capture the effect of a worldwide shift to more liberalism over time.  To examine whether the global 
shift to more liberal markets helped all countries, I use an autoregressive panel corrected standard 
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error (PCSE) OLS (Beck and Katz 1995) with a lagged dependent variable to examine this 
relationship.  
Pre- to Post-Neoliberal Transition Differences Model.  Finally, as a parsimonious means of 
modeling growth changes over the neoliberal transition, and to capture unmeasured, unit-specific 
effects, I perform a cross-sectional regression of changes in pre- to post-1995 growth rates on the 
changes experienced in these predictors over the sample period.  Doing so does not tell us whether 
more liberal, well governed or well-financed countries grew faster, but rather whether stronger 
departures from a country’s own baseline predictor levels results in stronger growth.    
MISSING DATA REDRESSES 
Any analysis that contemplates the causes of economic growth engages concepts whose data 
coverage can be limited both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Limited data coverage poses several 
problems in the inference-making process, and is particularly problematic in analyses comparing political 
and economic variables across developing countries. Conventional methods for coping with missing data 
discard any country-year in which a single variable score is missing, which means that our model results 
(and in turn our inferences) tend to only incorporate the experiences of well-represented countries (like 
the OECD) or years (typically more recent ones), or the effects of well-represented predictors (e.g., per 
capita GDP or trade). If no such restrictions are made, there will be very little data left to analyze. These 
restrictions are cause for concern, as the results of cross-national political economic analyses may 
not to be robust to sample composition (Honaker and King 2010). One can sacrifice the use of 
poorly covered variables, but may avoid considering highly important controls in the process.  The 
analysis below presents evidence that sample composition can affect the estimated effects of the 
variables we examine.  
This concern suggests that it is important to capitalize on recent developments in analytical 
redresses to missing data. This analysis employs the multiple imputation framework advanced by 
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Gary King et al. (2001), which tends to render results that “will normally be better than, and almost 
always not worse than, listwise deletion.” (p. 51).  An accessible introduction to multiple imputation 
with randomness is offered by Allison (2002).  It was implemented using the Amelia II package 
(Honaker, King and Blackwell 2007)2  and imputed as described in King et al. (2001).3  Diagnostics 
generally suggested credible results, although the imputations appear to underestimate extreme 
values on many indicators.4 
Patterns of missing data initially led to concerns that the resulting analysis would remain 
biased, even with data corrections.  The sample considers 161 countries over six periods, rendering 
a possible 966 country-periods to be analyzed.  Table 2 (below) describes the data, and highlights 
variability in the representation of particular variables or countries in my set, along with basic 
descriptive statistics.   
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Central government debt and cash balance are not well-represented in this set.  Both 
indicators were not measured before 1990 (but are represented in the 1985-1990 period by virtue 
of there being scores in 1990), and cover at most one-third of the sample in any given period.  
Ultimately, however, estimates involving these measures appear reasonable.  First, our data 
                                                             
2
 Missing data are assumed to be missing at random (MAR), as opposed to missing completely at random 
(Allison 2002). In this analysis, the MAR assumption is rooted in the observation that other covariates examined 
here often offer reasonable predictors of missingness, particularly per capita GDP.    
3
 See Honaker, King and Blackwell (2007)  for an extended explanation of the operation.  In addition to the 
variables tested here, the data imputation model also used regional dummies, remittances, net capital account, 
external debt, principal arrears, interest expenditures, official debt grace period, grant on issues, debt maturity, 
public and public guaranteed debt service, bank credit, domestic credit provided to private sector, portfolio 
investment and education measures.  Many of these variables attempted to capture the (dis)repair of public finances 
and access to international capital markets, or the general levels of development.   Lags and leads were included for 
most variables in the model. Variable shifts and transformations were performed before the imputation process. A 
polynomial of time was specified at 2. Ten sets were imputed.  An empirical prior of 50 was used.  Random seed 
was set at 120. 
4
 Imputation diagnostics suggest that imputed values were generally reasonable estimates. Overimputation 
diagnostics suggest that the imputation model tends to estimates extreme values are more moderate (i.e., large and 
negative values were predicted to be negative, but only moderately large, and vice-versa for very large positive 
values), but there was a positive relationship between observed values and their imputed estimates in this diagnostic.  
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overimputation diagnostics suggest that the model estimates reported values well when they are 
extricated from the data and re-estimated by the imputation model.  In part, this may be the result 
of the imputation process having used a wide battery of additional indicators that could be used to 
estimate public finances.  Second, the analyses reported below suggest that the imputation process 
is probably not generating results.  For example, central government debt is insignificant during 
earlier periods, when that indicator is measured more sparsely and hence involves more estimated 
data.  Second, although cash balance does seem to be significant in earlier periods, this relationship 
shows up as significant in cross-sectional models that use listwise deletion. 
A Second Look at the Data 
The deconstructed EFW indices offer a different sense of countries’ political-economic and 
policy environment compared to the original index.  Table 3 (below) illustrates these changes by 
presenting the mean predictor scores by world regions, income groups, and among selected 
countries.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
While wealthier countries tend to be more liberal, better governed and more price stable, 
the rich world is more strongly distinguished from developing countries by their governance and 
price system stability than their liberalism.  Some regions – notably Latin America – have made 
great strides towards laissez-faire without improving governance commensurately.  Aggressive 
liberalization is more common in the English-speaking G7, while liberalism levels outside of that 
group approach the means of developing regions like Latin America or East Asia.  Many non-Anglo 
G7 members maximize good governance instead of or in addition to economic liberalism, but their 
overall “economic freedom” scores may not diverge from highly liberal, less well-governed 
countries because liberalism indicators are strongly weighted in the EFW.  In contrast, the BRIC 
economies are not outstanding in terms of liberalism or governance.  Their distinguishing 
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characteristic is that they are large markets and hence attractive investment destinations because 
even a small market share in these economies can translate into sizeable profits. 
At first glance, economic liberalism does not distinguish fast- from slow-growth countries.  
Latin America is roughly as liberal as Eastern Europe, even though the former tended to stagnate 
while the latter prospered.  Both the former USSR and Middle East & North Africa are about as 
liberal as East Asia, but failed to grow quickly.  Sub-Saharan Africa trails South Asia in economic 
growth, despite the fact that the former is slightly the more liberal of these two regions.   
Comparing regional means obfuscates individual differences between countries’ political-
economic institutions and performance.  Table 4 (below) presents the mean pairwise correlations, 
p-values and number of observations across the six periods examined in next section’s regression 
models.  On average, only governance correlates well with economic growth.  This gives the 
impression that governance is of key consequences in resolving the puzzle of growth, but these 
relationships seem to vary over time. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Governance’s correlation with growth was relatively invariant over time.  Other predictors’ 
relationships with growth were variable.  Figure 1 (below) depicts the pairwise correlation 
between economic growth and the six predictors mentioned above on a period-by-period basis.   
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
During the early-1980s, governance, inflation and inward investment correlated strongly 
with growth.  Liberalism tended to be stronger in well-governed, low inflation and high inward 
investment, but its correlation with growth itself is weak.  Two clusters of countries play a role in 
producing these relationships.  The first includes countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, 
who register strong governance scores and high growth.    There are also countries whose 
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economies contracted while registering very low governance scores, including several Latin 
American/Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African countries.  Many of them were plagued by war, civil 
disorder, state breakdowns and kleptocratic dictators.  While the fast-growing Asian economies 
were relatively liberal, so were many crumbling Latin American/Caribbean and Persian Gulf 
economies.  
In our 1985 – 1990 period, data on fiscal sustainability becomes available, and shows a 
strong and highly significant correlation with growth.  The debt crisis continued to strain many 
developing countries’ economies, and countries with budget surpluses and low debt levels found 
themselves in an advantageous position.  This period is produced by averaging data from 1985 to 
1990, inclusive, so it will capture countries’ often dramatic shifts towards liberal economies.   
Moving forward, the impact of cash balance diminishes while that of government debt 
fluctuates.  Over the neoliberal era, credit markets generally remained quite loose compared to the 
1980s or today, making it less troublesome for states to cover deficits.  Baltic and East Asian 
countries grew quickly while carrying light debts, while many distressed countries’ growth 
crumbled under high public debts.  One possible explanation of debt’s oscillating relationship with 
growth is that credit markets grew nervous about major credit risks during the epidemic of 
systemic crises during the late-1990s, but not during the credit boom of the early-1990s.  Despite 
these moments of crisis, sovereign credit markets loosened in the long-term, making it less-and-less 
burdensome to finance budgetary shortfalls.  By 2007, credit markets had become nervous, and 
high debt countries might have felt strain.  After 2008, one might expect the costs of budget deficits 
and public debt to be very high.  Sovereign lending is considerably tighter, and countries that 
wrestle with the prospect of a debt crisis are experience substantial slowdowns.   
After peaking in the early-1990s, the correlation between liberalism and growth fades.  This 
effect is partly produced by the fact that Latin America & the Caribbean was quite liberal, but often 
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faltered economically.  Liberalism does retain some significance through the late-1990s and early-
2000s, but these results are substantially influenced by particularly illiberal countries stagnating 
serious, like Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone or Uganda.  
These were also countries with serious governance issues. By the late-2000s, liberalism’s pairwise 
correlation with growth is not significant.  Central government debt levels become strong correlates 
of growth, and, unlike previous period’s growth correlates, debt does not seem to be related to per 
capita GDP, liberalism or governance.  
Inflation also becomes a diminishing concern over time, as global inflation rates stabilize at 
low levels.  Inflation is probably a positive correlate of growth today, in the post-2008 era, as many 
countries now grapple with the prospects of deflation.  
Over time, faster-growth countries were well-governed, maintained strong public finances 
and tended to attract FDI.  As the following section shows, governance is one “freedom” indicator 
that retains a significant relationship with growth, unlike liberalism and inflation control.  
Governance’s relationship with growth is diminished once public financial and FDI controls are 
included.  Net inward FDI grew dramatically and across-the-board during the period under study, 
and public finances generally improved over this period.  Governance, in contrast, saw no major 
improvement worldwide after the late-1990s.  In many instances, governance quality eroded 
during the early-2000s, although it improved afterward. 
Analysis 
The analysis that follows begins with an attempt to discern whether the often-observed 
relationship between economic growth and “freedom”, as conceived by Gwartney and Lawson 
(2009), is dependent on (1) the “freedom” index’s conflation of liberalism, governance and inflation 
and (2) the ahistoricity of prior analyses.  The results suggest that economic growth exhibits no 
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significant, trans-historical relationship with economic liberalism proper.  Then, a second analysis 
pursues the hypothesis that changes in developing countries’ macrofinances were important 
determinants of growth, net of the effects of liberalism, governance and wealth.  The “freedom” 
index’s inflation component touches on macrofinancial concerns, but we add measures for 
international investment and sustainable public finances to the regression.  The results suggest that 
macrofinances are important explanations of prosperity, and their inclusion wipes away what 
remains of liberalism’s relationship with growth. 
Deconstructing the “Economic Freedom” Index.  Table 5 (below) presents twelve cross-
sectional robust regressions between economic growth and “economic freedom.” Each of the six 
five-year period is presented twice, with a regression of growth on the original (top row) and 
deconstructed (bottom row) EFW.  The bottom row of regressions also includes a per capita GDP 
control, as both economic freedom and its components are strongly related to wealth. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
We are able to examine 52 countries with complete data across all periods examined here, 
and this sample is predominantly Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Within this group, 
“economic freedom” is continuously significant, and thus a possibly timeless predictor of growth.  
However, deconstructing the “freedom” index reveals that different constituent measures drove the 
combined index’s results in different periods.  In the early 1980s, well-governed countries with low 
inflation tended to prosper.  As noted in the previous section, many comparatively liberal countries 
suffered from financial crisis and severe recession.  In the late-1980s and early-1990s, liberalism’s 
relationship with growth is significant.  Around 1990, developing countries were enjoying financial 
stabilization while liberalizing, sometimes in return for having government debt issues 
underwritten.  In the late-1990s and early-2000s, governance is again an important predictor.  
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Between 2005 and 2007, a new pattern emerges, in which growth is fastest in richer countries and 
inflation correlates positively with growth.5   
So the EFW’s strong cross-sectional relationship with growth is partly because “freedom” 
encapsulates a bundle of potentially important country characteristics that may help growth.  Since 
1980, good governance, freer markets, controlled prices and high wealth have driven the positive 
relationship between “freedom” and growth in changing measures.   There is no indication that 
“freedom” in terms of “free market capitalism” is a time-consistent growth predictor.  Freer market 
economies have only stood out as particularly prosperous in one period, near the end of the Cold 
War.  This was an era in which countries simultaneously embraced liberalism, saw governance 
improve, had their price systems stabilized, enjoyed a restoration of government credit, saw a 
nascent boom in investment, and experienced a wide range of other changes.  Cross-sectional 
comparisons tell us what distinguished high- from low-growth countries in a particular year.  It 
cannot tell us the effects of the whole world making a collective step towards liberalism, better 
governance, and so on.  This question can be addressed through cross-sectional time series 
analysis, to which we turn next. 
Cross-Sectional Time Series Results.  Table 7 (below) presents three clusters of regression 
models, comprised of three models each.  The first model in each cluster assesses all six periods, the 
second considers only periods in which liberalism was diffusing and economies were transitioning 
(1980 – 1995), and the third assesses periods after neoliberal reforms diffused globally and became 
firmly entrenched in countries’ policy environments. 
                                                             
5 What about the macrofinancial stability and inward investment variables?  Unfortunately, missing data 
made the task of creating a sizable group that could be compared over several periods difficult.  There is some 
indication that these variables are often significant in regressions that handle missing data through listwise 
deletion, but multiply-imputed sets render results that are almost across-the-board null in cross-sectional 
regressions.  If pushed to interpret these results, it would be that the evidence offers no clear indication that 
any of these indicators differentiate fast- from slow-growth countries on a year-by-year basis.  However, the 
next set of regressions will show that longitudinal, collective changes in macrofinances rendered collective 
improvements in growth. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
The first cluster (Models 1-1 to 1-3) looks at the relationship between the original 
“economic freedom” index and growth.  Model 1-1 reproduces a commonly-rendered ahistorical 
model.  As with previous studies, “freedom” is a significant predictor of growth, even with a lagged 
dependent variable and base-year GDP control.   However, Models 1-2 and 1-3 suggest that 
“freedom’s” ability to predict growth is largely confined to the period before neoliberal reforms 
diffused widely.  Something caused “freedom” to lose its predictive power. 
In the second cluster, I unparcel “freedom” into its three constituent measures.  This cluster 
shows that, of the “freedom” components, only governance served as a significant predictor before 
and after the neoliberal transition (Models 2-2 and 2-3).  Curiously, the liberalism component is 
significant when considering all periods simultaneously (Model 2-1), but not within individual pre- 
and post-reform subsets.  I interpret these results to be suggesting that the developing world’s 
collective transition to freer market capitalism near the Cold War’s end was consequential in 
producing across-the-board improvements in growth.  In other words, it is not that the world’s 
most liberal countries outgrow others in most periods.  Instead, something in the world’s global 
transition to neoliberalism rendered more prosperity worldwide. 
The third cluster of model adds the macrofinancial stability and international investment 
indicators.  Their inclusion diminishes the effect of liberalism, rendering it insignificant.  
Governance maintains predictive power, but it is principally concentrated in the latter era of 
neoliberalism (Model 3-3).  These models suggest that investment and macrofinancial stability are 
highly significant predictors.  Cash balance’s effect diminishes over time, as short-term sovereign 
credit markets loosened.  The effect of net inward FDI decays as well, but remains significant.  
Central government debt is a very strong predictor that is undoubtedly related to the systemic 
stability concerns that materialized in the late-1990s and right before the 2008 crisis. 
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Pre- to Post-1995 Differences Model.  Our pre- to post-1995 differences model suggests 
that fiscal balance improvements and inflation containment were most important.  Table 6 (below) 
presents the results of these regressions. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Model 4-1 suggests that countries grew faster if they embraced more dramatic liberalization 
reforms, although the R-Squared suggests that the transition to liberalism does not render a model 
with strong explanatory power.   Model 4-2 renders a substantially better-fitting model, and 
suggests that inflation control and liberalism helped propel greater improvements in growth rates.  
However, Model 4-3 suggests that the inclusion of a fiscal deficit measure erases liberalism’s 
significance, although inflation control maintains some importance.  Overall, this contrast suggests 
that countries did not experience sharper gains in growth rates when they adopted liberalization 
reforms more aggressively. 
Fixed-effect models like these ask whether countries tended to improve as they became 
more liberal relative to their own idiosyncratic baseline liberalism levels, as opposed to whether 
comparatively liberal or financially stable countries were more prosperous.  The world’s most 
prosperous region (East Asia) was more systemically stable and had better public finances during 
the crisis of the 1980s.  As a result, they may have enjoyed strong growth while having realized 
more modest changes in macro-level finances – they didn’t need the kinds of dramatic changes 
required of, for example, Latin America.   
Judging Neoliberal Reform 
How should these results be interpreted?  For “economic freedom” alone to be considered 
an empirically-supported growth predictor, analysts must ignore two things.  First, they must 
accept the blending of liberalism, governance and inflation as a productive way of characterizing 
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policy.  Doing so is problematic, in part because some countries maximize governance while others 
maximize liberalism, and in part because blending these different concepts can mislead audiences 
into thinking that the benefits of good governance or controlled prices are benefits of freer markets.  
Second, they must believe that liberalism’s benefits exist across historical context.  Doing so makes 
audiences think that, because liberalism might have helped us prosper in the late-1980s and early-
1990s, it should help us prosper in the 2000s.  The evidence suggests that this is not the case.  
“Freedom” worked well when its early adopters were embracing it, but not when it became the 
policy of the world-at-large.  If we deconstruct this “freedom” index, the analysis suggests that the 
governance indicator is its strongest predictor.  When we isolate the effects of liberal policies more 
specifically, their effects on growth are more tenuous.   
However, macrofinances and real international investment are clearly stronger growth 
predictors, whose inclusion wipes out most of the effects of any “freedom” measure.  According to 
these models, a developing country’s surest bet of securing long-term economic growth was to 
maximize international direct investment and to minimize exposure to public deficit or debt 
concerns.  Developing countries prosper when (generally rich) foreigners want to start up factories 
and businesses inside their territories, and/or when the government seems secure in its ability to 
avoid systemic financial crises.   
Liberalism’s relationship with growth is confined to one particular historical context, and it 
disappears when we consider the systemic financial stabilization and global investment boom that 
occurred concurrently.  The idea that liberal economies are intrinsically superior modes of 
organizing the economy looks very weak.  Liberalism has no significant relationship with growth 
once governance, stabilization and international investment are considered.  If liberalism conferred 
the vast range of economic benefits that Chicago School proponents argued to exist – better 
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decision-making, economic responsiveness, control of corruption and so on – why does it have no 
residual effect on growth after these controls are included in a model? 
A market fundamentalist might argue that neoliberalism helped produce these financial 
changes, which is probably true to some degree.  However, the key question is how did these 
reforms help countries?  The second perspective on post-1980s’ crisis reform stressed the 
importance of fiscal balance and systemic stability.  Liberalism helped provide an ideological 
justification for cutting government expenditures, which were necessary to reestablish financial 
stability.  Government cutbacks alone did not help.  In fact, Western governments intervened on 
international credit markets on behalf of beleaguered governments, and did so again after 2008.   
The story that emerges from this study is that conservative fiscal and macrofinancial management 
are important, as well as being an attractive investment destination, but a government can 
intervene in markets actively while keeping fiscal surplus and being an attractive investment outlet.   
The main point that emerges from this study is that the often-recited policy axiom that freer 
markets generate prosperity is not a strong one.  Obviously, people are much more skeptical about 
market fundamentalism after the 2008 crisis.  These findings suggest that free market reforms’ 
payoffs were tenuous even during neoliberalism’s heyday.  Liberalization reforms were one part of 
a wider set of political-economic changes that occurred during the late-1980s and 1990s.  Many 
analysts latch on this one aspect of political-economic change as a decisive factor in delivering the 
prosperity of the past 20 years.  The evidence presented here suggests that this belief may be an 
institutionalized policy axiom, which may have been highly pragmatic at one point in time, but has 
not been a product of skeptical, pragmatic policy in a long while. 
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FIGURE 1: CROSS-SECTIONAL CORRELATION BETWEEN GROWTH AND ITS PREDICTORS, ALL AVAILABLE DATA, EARLY-1980S TO LATE-2000S
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TABLE 1: CONSTITUENT SUB-INDICES OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD INDEX 
Component Conditions that Enhance “Freedom” 
Size of Government 
Expenditures, Taxes 
and Enterprises 
Low government consumption, transfers, subsidies, 
investment and enterprise ownership, and low taxes. 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
Low and invariant tariffs, low regulatory trade barriers, 
formal market-determined exchange rates, relatively large 
trade sectors, low capital market controls 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labor and Business 
Private banking, openness to international banking, private 
sector-directed credit, low interest rate controls, minimum 
wages, regulatory compliance costs, prevalence of 
centralized collective bargaining, price controls, need to pay 
bribes or military conscription. 
Access to Sound 
Money 
Low and invariable inflation, low growth in M1 money 
supply, no restrictions on foreign currency bank accounts 
Legal Structure & 
Security of Property 
Rights 
Independent judiciary, impartial courts, protection of 
property rights, no military interference in politics or 
courts, rule of law, legal enforcement of contracts, low 
regulation on real estate 
Source:  Gwartney and Lawson (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES EXAMINED HERE, OECD EXCLUDED 
Variable Obs Missing Mean SD Min Max Notes 
Per Capita GDP 849 12% 1.9 4.5 -25.1 28.1 
 "Economic Freedom" 555 43% 5.8 1.0 2.7 8.7 Under-representation of countries with lower incomes and 
less economic integration with West (e.g., socialist Soviet-
allied countries) 
Economic Liberalism 588 39% 5.8 1.3 0.0 8.8 
Governance 543 44% 4.9 1.4 2.0 8.4 
Inflation 870 10% 14.0 19.7 -6.2 100.0 
 Per Capita GDP 872 10% 2,883 4,509 84 36,949 
 Net FDI 764 21% 2.9 4.3 -7.5 40.0 
 Cash Balance 344 64% -1.4 4.8 -35.5 19.1 
No pre-1990 data. 
Central Govt. Debt 207 79% 51.3 36.5 0.2 244.0 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: ORIGINAL & MODIFIED EFW INDEX & SUB-INDEX SCORES BY WORLD REGION AND INCOME 
GROUP AND FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2005 - 2007 
 
Econ. 
Freedom 
Econ. 
Liberalism Governance Inflation 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
OECD 7.6 7.5 8.2 2.8 $35,069 2.1 
Eastern Europe 6.9 7.1 5.9 5.8 $14,306 3.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 6.7 7.0 5.1 7.6 $8,722 1.8 
East Asia & Pacific 6.6 6.6 5.7 6.8 $9,115 2.7 
Ex-USSR 6.6 6.7 5.5 16.1 $5,693 1.8 
Middle East & North Africa 6.6 6.6 6.3 10.9 $17,751 1.3 
South Asia 6.0 5.8 4.6 7.5 $2,534 4.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.9 6.0 4.4 15.1 $3,299 1.2 
High Income 7.6 7.4 7.9 4.3 $34,749 2.0 
Upper-Middle Income 6.9 7.0 6.1 8.1 $13,908 2.8 
Lower-Middle Income 6.4 6.5 5.2 8.7 $5,427 2.2 
Low Income 5.9 6.0 4.3 14.4 $1,444 1.1 
United States 8.1 8.2 7.7  2.8 $42,556 1.9 
United Kingdom 8.0 7.9 8.4 2.5 $33,623 2.2 
Canada 8.0 7.9 8.5 3.2 $35,786 1.7 
France 7.2 7.1 7.6 2.4 $30,317 1.5 
Germany 7.6 7.2 8.7 1.2 $32,643 1.9 
Japan 7.5 7.3 8.0 -0.9 $31,094 2.1 
Italy 7.0 7.2 6.2 2.3 $28,439 1.5 
China 6.3 6.2 6.0 5.5 $4,800 8.8 
India 6.5 5.9 6.3 5.1 $2,492 4.4 
Russia 6.4 6.3 5.7 16.9 $13,327 0.8 
Brazil 6.0 5.9 5.2 5.7 $8,978 1.0 
Total (incl. OECD) 6.6 6.7 5.7 9.4 $11,941 1.9 
 
 
TABLE 4: MEAN PAIRWISWE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STUDY'S FOCAL VARIABLES,  NON-OECD COUNTRIES ACROSS SIX TIME PERIODS 
 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
(1) Economic  
 
1.000 
               Growth 
 
141.5 
              (2) Economic  
 
0.226 
 
1.000 
             Liberalism 
 
94.2 
 
98.0 
            (3) Governance 
 
0.308 ** 0.339 ** 1.000 
           
  
86.8 
 
90.3 
 
90.5 
          (4) Inflation 
 
-0.135 
 
-0.309 * -0.167 
 
1.000 
         (logged) 
 
140.8 
 
95.7 
 
88.3 
 
145.0 
        (5) Cent. Govt.  
 
-0.359 
 
-0.175 
 
-0.195 
 
0.079 
 
1.000 
       Debt (logged) 
 
33.8 
 
28.0 
 
26.2 
 
34.0 
 
34.5 
      (6) Cash Balance 
 
0.228 
 
0.328 
 
0.247 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.313 ^ 1.000 
     
  
56.0 
 
46.0 
 
44.0 
 
56.7 
 
31.2 
 
57.3 
    (7) Net FDI 
 
0.233 
 
0.255 ^ 0.253 ^ -0.121 
 
0.003 
 
0.111 
 
1.000 
   
  
123.3 
 
89.8 
 
82.8 
 
125.2 
 
32.8 
 
54.2 
 
127.3 
  (8) Per Cap. GDP 0.012 
 
0.455 *** 0.496 *** -0.121 
 
-0.249 
 
0.205 
 
0.128 
 
1.000 
 at Base Year 
 
117.3 
 
85.8 
 
79.8 
 
117.0 
 
28.3 
 
45.7 
 
105.5 
 
118.0 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10.   
Reported pairwise correlations, p-values and N’s represent averages over all six periods examined in this study.
 
 
 
TABLE 5: ROBUST REGRESSION OF GROWTH ON "FREEDOM" AND ITS COMPOSITE 
MEASURES, FIVE-YEAR PERIODS BEGINNING IN 1980 - 1985 
Period ’80 – ‘85 ’85 – ‘90 ’90 – ‘95 ’95 – ‘00 ’00 – ‘05 ’05 – ‘07 
Model 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 
EFW 0.956* 1.181** 1.496*** 0.630* 0.976** 1.126*** 
 
(0.431) (0.365) (0.370) (0.273) (0.288) (0.300) 
Constant -4.821* -5.496** -6.848** -2.170 -4.020* -3.529^ 
 
(2.209) (1.913) (2.091) (1.663) (1.800) (1.950) 
N 57 57 57 57 57 56 
R-Squared 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.21 
Model 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 
Liberalism -0.352 0.934* 0.882* 0.173 0.120 0.343 
 
(0.455) (0.404) (0.393) (0.261) (0.270) (0.276) 
Governance 0.802* 0.583^ 0.087 0.577* 0.376^ 0.108 
 
(0.317) (0.324) (0.425) (0.256) (0.198) (0.253) 
Inflation† -1.687* 0.529 0.021 -0.308 0.418 2.085^ 
 
(0.823) (0.560) (0.705) (0.579) (0.746) (1.108) 
Per Cap 0.247 -0.657^ 0.488 -0.164 0.187 0.690** 
GDP† (0.414) (0.391) (0.389) (0.252) (0.220) (0.232) 
Constant 2.255 -3.908 -7.509* -0.195 -2.940 -10.020* 
 
(3.661) (2.889) (3.210) (2.644) (2.865) (3.853) 
N 57 57 57 57 56 56 
R-Squared 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.12 0.15 0.32 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10 
†logged 
Standard error estimates in parentheses under coefficient estimates 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: BECK-KATZ PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERROR OLS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
SIX FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS FROM 1980 - 2007 
Model 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3 
Years ’80-‘07 ’80 – ‘95 ’95 – ‘07 ’80 – ‘07 ’80 – ‘95 ’95 – ‘07 ’80 – ‘07 ’80 – ‘95 ’95 – ‘07 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth (lagged) 
0.235 
(0.172) 
0.137 
(0.240) 
0.224 
(0.302) 
0.232 
(0.170) 
0.129 
(0.234) 
0.228 
(0.212) 
0.197 
(0.154) 
0.136 
(0.214) 
0.187 
(0.179) 
“Economic 
Freedom” 
1.375*** 
(0.369) 
1.387** 
(0.374) 
0.751 
(0.454) 
      
Economic 
Liberalism 
   0.690* 
(0.300) 
0.567 
(0.374) 
0.325 
(0.333) 
0.411 
(0.269) 
0.248 
(0.353) 
0.301 
(0.299) 
Governance    0.486* 
(0.203) 
0.512* 
(0.237) 
0.665* 
(0.243) 
0.344^ 
(0.192) 
0.265 
(0.218) 
0.656** 
(0.226) 
Inflation†    -0.927 
(0.623) 
-1.251^ 
(0.648) 
0.231 
(0.835) 
-0.846 
(0.631) 
-1.188^ 
(0.657) 
0.230 
(0.847) 
Central Govt. Debt 
(% GDP)† 
      -0.654* 
(0.303) 
-0.603 
(0.378) 
-0.988*** 
(0.266) 
Cash Balance  
(% GDP) 
      0.134*** 
(0.037) 
0.128** 
(0.048) 
0.086 
(0.054) 
Net Inward FDI  
(% GDP)† 
      0.213** 
(0.070) 
0.313*** 
(0.090) 
0.162* 
(0.075) 
Per Capita GDP at 
Base Year† 
-0.395** 
(0.151) 
-0.432* 
(0.179) 
-0.325* 
(0.156) 
-0.417** 
(0.168) 
-0.482* 
(0.213) 
-0.551** 
(0.191) 
-0.512** 
(0.187) 
-0.515* 
(0.243) 
-0.638** 
(0.215) 
Constant -3.536* 
(1.907) 
-3.618* 
(1.642) 
0.540 
(1.885) 
1.389 
(2.565) 
2.691 
(2.691) 
0.709 
(3.339) 
5.790* 
(2.691) 
7.527* 
(3.118) 
4.519 
(3.938) 
Mean R-Squared 0.202 0.134 0.126 0.209 0.152 0.130 0.300 0.262 0.265 
N 966 644 483 966 644 483 966 644 483 
N(groups) 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10 
†logged 
Standard error estimates in parentheses under coefficient estimates 
Coefficient and R-Squared estimates represent mean of ten models on ten imputed sets. 
See Allison (2002) for details on the calculation of standard errors from these imputed sets. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: PRE- VERSUS POST-1995 DIFFERENCES 
MODEL OF MEAN GROWTH RATES 
Model 4-1 4-2 4-3 
“Economic 
Freedom” 
1.107* 
(0.531) 
-- -- 
Economic 
Liberalism 
-- 1.021* 
(0.493) 
0.762 
(0.573) 
Governance -- -0.039 
(0.553) 
0.168 
(0.542) 
Inflation† -- -1.756* 
(0.820) 
-1.566^ 
(0.917) 
Central Govt. Debt 
(% GDP)† 
-- -- 0.063 
(0.066) 
Cash Balance  
(% GDP) 
-- -- 0.393* 
(0.181) 
Net Inward FDI  
(% GDP)† 
-- -- 0.216 
(0.235) 
Per Capita GDP at 
Base Year† 
0.058 
(0.266) 
0.161 
(0.284) 
0.310 
(0.402) 
Constant 0.878 
(2.128) 
-0.756 
(2.307) 
-2.297 
(3.553) 
Mean R-Squared 0.049 0.175 0.328 
N 161 161 161 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10;  †logged 
Standard error estimates in parentheses under coefficient 
estimates.  Coefficient and R-Squared estimates represent 
mean of ten models on ten imputed sets.  See Allison (2002) 
for details on the calculation of standard errors from these 
imputed sets. 
 
